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Abstract
In this paper, bankruptcy situations with interval data are studied. Two classical bankruptcy
rules, namely the proportional rule and the rights-egalitarian rule, are extended to the interval
setting. It turns out that these bankruptcy interval rules generate elements in the interval core
of a related cooperative interval game.
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This paper focuses on bankruptcy situations with interval data and related
cooperative interval games. Classical bankruptcy problems and bankruptcy
games have been intensively studied. We refer here to O’Neill (1982), Au-
mann and Maschler (1985), Herrero, Maschler and Villar (1999) and Young
(1987). In a classical bankruptcy situation a certain amount of money (es-
tate) has to be divided among some people (claimants) who have individual
claims on the estate, and the total claim is weakly larger than the estate.
A bankruptcy situation with set of claimants N is a pair (E,d), where E ≥ 0
is the estate to be divided and d ∈ RN
+ is the vector of claims such that P
i∈N di ≥ E. We assume without loss of generality that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ ... ≤ dn
and denote by BRN the set of bankruptcy situations with player set N. The
total claim is denoted by D =
P
i∈N di. A bankruptcy rule is a function
f : BRN → RN which assigns to each bankruptcy situation (E,d) ∈ BRN
a payoﬀ vector f(E,d) ∈ RN such that 0 ≤ f(E,d) ≤ d (reasonability) and P
i∈N fi(E,d) = E (eﬃciency). In this paper we are interested in bankruptcy
rules that are coordinate-wise (weakly) increasing in E. The proportional
rule (PROP) is one of the most often used in real life. It is deﬁned by
PROPi(E,d) =
di
DE for all i ∈ N. Another interesting bankruptcy rule is
the rights-egalitarian rule, deﬁned by fRE
i (E,d) = di + 1
n(E − D), for each
(E,d) ∈ BRN and all i ∈ N. We notice that the rights-egalitarian rule was
introduced in Herrero, Maschler and Villar (1999) as a division rule for all
circumstances of division problems.
Recall that a cooperative game in coalitional form is a pair < N,v >, where
N is the set of players, and v : 2N → R is a function assigning to each
coalition S ∈ 2N a real number, such that v(∅) = 0. We denote by GN the
family of all classical cooperative games with player set N. The core (Gillies














for each v ∈ GN. A game v ∈ GN is convex if and only if v(S∪T)+v(S∩T) ≥
v(S) + v(T) for all S,T ∈ 2N.
To each bankruptcy situation (E,d) ∈ BRN one can associate a pessimistic
bankruptcy game vE,d deﬁned by vE,d(S) = (E−
P
i∈N\S di)+ for each S ∈ 2N,
where x+ = max(0,x). The game vE,d is convex and the bankruptcy rules
1PROP and fRE provide allocations in the core of the game.
Cooperative interval games arising from bankruptcy situations where
the claims can vary within closed intervals are introduced and analyzed in
Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2003). A bankruptcy situation where the claims
are certain but the available estate can vary within a closed interval is used
in Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and Tijs (2008) to illustrate cores for two-person
interval games. This paper considers bankruptcy situations where the es-
tate and (some of the) claims vary within closed intervals, which we call
bankruptcy interval situations.
It is important to consider interval claims because in various disputes
including inheritance (O’Neill (1982)) claimants face uncertainty regarding
their eﬀective rights and, as a result, individual claims can be expressed in
the form of closed intervals without any probability distributions attached
to them. In such situations our model based on interval claims ﬁts better
than the more standard claims approach and, additionally, oﬀers ﬂexibility in
conﬂict resolution under interval uncertainty of the estate at stake. Economic
applications of our approach include funds’ allocation of a ﬁrm among its
divisions (Pulido, S´ anchez-Soriano and Llorca (2002), Pulido et al. (2008)),
priority problems (Moulin (2000)), distribution of penalty costs in delayed
projects (Branzei et al. (2002)) and disputes related to cooperation in joint
projects where agents have restricted willingness to pay (Tijs and Branzei
(2004)).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic notions
and results from the theory of cooperative interval games. In Section 3
we introduce two bankruptcy interval rules which are the extensions to the
interval setting of the proportional rule and the rights-egalitarian rule for
classical bankruptcy situations. It turns out that these bankruptcy interval
rules generate allocations in the interval core of a related cooperative interval
game. Final comments are given in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some preliminaries from interval calculus (Moore (1979).








, |I| = I − I and α ∈ R+. Then,
I + J =
£






. The partial substraction operator
I −J is deﬁned (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008b)), only if |I| ≥ |J|,
by I − J =
£
I − J,I − J
¤
. Note that I − J ≤ I − J. We recall that I is
2weakly better than J, which we denote by I < J, if and only if I ≥ J and
I ≥ J. We also use the reverse notation J 4 I, if and only if J ≤ I and
J ≤ I.
A cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and
Tijs (2008)) is an ordered pair < N,w > where N = {1,2,...,n} is the
set of players, and w : 2N → I(R) is the characteristic function such that
w(∅) = [0,0]. For each S ∈ 2N, the worth set (or worth interval) w(S) of the
coalition S in the interval game < N,w > is of the form [w(S),w(S)], where
w(S) is the lower bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). The family of
all interval games with player set N is denoted by IGN. Some classical TU-
games associated with an interval game w ∈ IGN play a key role, namely the
border games < N,w >, < N,w > and the length game < N,|w| >, where
|w|(S) = w(S) − w(S) for each S ∈ 2N. Note that w = w + |w|.
Let w1,w2 ∈ IGN. We say that w1 4 w2 if w1(S) 4 w2(S) for each S ∈ 2N,
and deﬁne < N,w1+w2 > by (w1+w2)(S) = w1(S)+w2(S) for each S ∈ 2N.
For w1,w2 ∈ IGN with |w1(S)| ≥ |w2(S)| for each S ∈ 2N, < N,w1 − w2 >
is deﬁned by (w1 − w2)(S) = w1(S) − w2(S). Given w ∈ IGN and λ ∈ R+
we deﬁne < N,λw > by (λw)(S) = λ · w(S) for each S ∈ 2N.














We say that < N,w > is supermodular if
w(S) + w(T) 4 w(S ∪ T) + w(S ∩ T) for all S,T ∈ 2
N.
We call a game w ∈ IGN convex if < N,w > is supermodular and its length
game < N,|w| > is convex. For details on cooperative interval games we
refer the reader to Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a,b).
3 Bankruptcy situations with interval data
and related rules
A bankruptcy interval situation with a ﬁxed set of claimants N = {1,2,...,n}
is a pair (E,d) ∈ I(R)×I(R)N, where E = [E,E] < [0,0] is the estate to be
divided and d is the vector of interval claims with i-th coordinate di = [di,di],
3i ∈ N, such that [0,0] 4 d1 4 d2 4 ... 4 dn and E <
Pn
i=1 di. We note
that all selections ( ˜ E, ˜ d), where E < ˜ E < E and di < ˜ di < di, for all
i ∈ N, are traditional bankruptcy situations. We denote by d(N) the total
lower claim and by d(N) the total upper claim. We also use the notations
d(S) =
P
i∈S di and d(S) =
P
i∈S di for S ⊂ N. We denote by BRIN the
family of bankruptcy interval situations with set of claimants N.
A bankruptcy interval rule for bankruptcy interval situations is a function
F : BRIN → I(R)N assigning to each bankruptcy interval situation (E,d) ∈
BRIN a vector F(E,d) = (F1(E,d),...,Fn(E,d)) ∈ I(R)N, such that
(i) [0,0] 4 Fi(E,d) 4 di for each i ∈ N (reasonability);
(ii)
Pn
i=1 Fi(E,d) = E (eﬃciency).
In this paper we look at the bankruptcy rules PROP and fRE and extend
them to the interval setting. We denote by BRIN
1 the family of all bankruptcy
situations (E,d) ∈ BRIN which satisfy the condition
E/d(N) ≤ E/d(N), (1)
and by BRIN
2 the family of all bankruptcy situations (E,d) ∈ BRIN which
satisfy the condition
|E| ≥ |d(N)|. (2)
Condition (1) can be read as: the available amount per-unit of lower-estate
is weakly smaller than the available amount per-unit of upper estate. Con-
dition (2) can be read as: the spread of uncertainty regarding the estate is
weakly larger than the total spread of uncertainty regarding the claims. Note
that conditions (1) and (2) are satisﬁed for all bankruptcy interval situations
where all the claim intervals are degenerate, i.e. di = di for all i ∈ N. Bank-
ruptcy interval situations where the estate is a nondegenerate interval, i.e.
E < E, and all the claims are uncertainty-free are studied in Branzei and
Dall’Aglio (2008).
The inclusion BRIN
1 ⊂ BRIN might be strict as the following example illus-
trates.
Example 3.1. Let (E,d) be a three-person bankruptcy situation. We suppose
that the claims of the players are closed intervals with d1 = [10,20], d2 =
[30,50] and d3 = [30,70], respectively and the estate is E = [60,100]. Then,
we obtain E/d(N) = 6/7 > 5/7 = E/d(N).
4The inclusion SBRIN
2 ⊂ SBRIN might be also strict as we can see from
Example 3.1, where |E| = 40 < 70 = |d(N)|. In the following we extend the
proportional rule and the rights-egalitarian rule to the interval setting.
First, note that
PROPi(E,d) = (di/d(N))E ≤ (di/d(N))E ≤ (di/d(N))E = PROPi(E,d)
for each i ∈ N, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from condition (1) and the
second inequality follows from [di,di] ∈ I(R).
We deﬁne the proportional interval rule PROP : BRIN
1 → I(R)N by
PROPi(E,d) = [PROPi(E,d),PROPi(E,d)],
for each (E,d) ∈ BRIN
1 and all i ∈ N. Second, note that
f
RE












for each i ∈ N, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from condition (2) and the
second inequality follows from [di,di] ∈ I(R).
We deﬁne the rights-egalitarian interval rule FRE : BRIN
2 → I(R)N by
F
RE





for each (E,d) ∈ BRIN
2 and all i ∈ N. The next proposition shows that
PROP and FRE are bankruptcy interval rules.
Proposition 3.1. Let B =
©
PROP,FREª
. Then, each interval rule F ∈ B
is eﬃcient and reasonable.
Proof. The eﬃciency of F follows from the eﬃciency of corresponding clas-





i∈N fi(E,d) = E and P
i∈N fi(E,d) = E. Further, the reasonability of F follows from
0 ≤ fi(E,d) ≤ di and 0 ≤ fi(E,d) ≤ di for each i ∈ N.
In the following we deﬁne a subclass of BRIN, denoted by SBRIN, con-
sisting of all bankruptcy interval situations such that
for each S ∈ 2
N with d(N \ S) ≤ E it holds |d(N \ S)| ≤ |E|. (3)
5We call a bankruptcy interval situation in SBRIN a strong bankruptcy inter-
val situation. With each (E,d) ∈ SBRIN we associate a cooperative interval
game < N,wE,d > deﬁned by wE,d(S) = [vE,d(S),vE,d(S)] for each S ⊂ N.
Note that (3) implies vE,d(S) ≤ vE,d(S) for each S ∈ 2N. We denote by
SBRIGN the family of all bankruptcy interval games wE,d with (E,d) ∈
SBRIN. We notice that wE,d ∈ SBRIGN is supermodular because vE,d
and vE,d ∈ GN are convex (see Proposition 3.2 in Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei
and Tijs (2008b)). The following example illustrates that wE,d ∈ SBRIGNis
supermodular but not necessarily convex.
Example 3.2. Let (E,d) be a two-person bankruptcy situation. We sup-
pose that the claims of the players are closed intervals d1 = [70,70] and
d2 = [80,80], respectively and the estate is E = [100,140]. Then, for each
i = 1,2 the corresponding game < N,wE,d > is given by wE,d(∅) = [0,0],
wE,d(1) = [20,60], wE,d(2) = [30,70] and wE,d(1,2) = [100,140]. This game
is supermodular, but is not convex because |wE,d| ∈ GN is not convex.
In the following we consider the restriction of the interval rule PROP to
SBRIN
1 = BRIN
1 ∩ SBRIN, and the restriction of the interval rule FRE to
SBRIN
2 = BRIN
2 ∩ SBRIN. In the next proposition we consider (E,d) ∈
SBRIN
1 if F is PROP, and (E,d) ∈ SBRIN
2 if F is FRE.
Proposition 3.2. Let F ∈ B. Then, F(E,d) ∈ C(wE,d) for each wE,d ∈
SBRIGN.
Proof. First, we have
n X
i=1




where the ﬁrst equality follows from eﬃciency of the bankruptcy interval
rules.
Second, take S ⊂ N. Then,
X
i∈S
Fi(E,d) = wE,d(N) −
X
i∈N\S




where the equality follows from eﬃciency and the inequality follows from
reasonability of the bankruptcy interval rules. Also,
P
i∈S Fi(E,d) < [0,0] by
reasonability. So,
P
i∈S Fi(E,d) < wE,d(S). Hence, F(E,d) ∈ C(wE,d).
64 Final comments
In this paper we deﬁne two bankruptcy interval rules by extending the pro-
portional rule and the rights-egalitarian rule to bankruptcy interval situa-
tions. An interesting topic for further research is to extend to the interval
setting the axiomatic characterizations of PROP and fRE and compare them
in the spirit of Herrero, Maschler and Villar (1999). Note that to compare
PROP with FRE we need to consider the restricted class BRIN
1 ∩ BRIN
2 .
The use of the allocations generated by the rules PROP and FRE in prac-
tical bankruptcy-like situations with interval uncertainty is two-fold. Firstly,
these interval allocations are used to inform claimants about what they can
expect, between two boundaries, from the division problem at stake. Sec-
ondly, when the realization of the estate occurs, they are used to obtain
standard allocations. We refer the reader to Branzei, Tijs and Alparslan
G¨ ok (2008) for ways to transform vectors of intervals in vectors of real num-
bers.
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